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Rights and Responsibilities 
in Medical Ethics 
Clifton Perry 
Clifton Perry received his 
Ph.D. in philosophy from the 
University of California. He held 
a post-doctoral clinical fellow-
ship in bioethics at the Univer-
sity of Tennessee and has taught 
at the University of California 
and West Virginia University. He 
is presently an assistant professor 
of philosophy at San Jose State 
University. This article and the 
one following, by Prof. John 
Ladd, complement one another. 
Recently, attempts have been made to extirpate legalism or talk of 
rights and duties from the field of medical ethics. In particular, Prof. 
John Ladd has endeavored to specify important differences between 
the model of rights and the model which properly captures the ethical 
aspects essential to the relationship between patient and physician. 1 If 
Ladd is correct in his analysis, then the ramifications for medical 
ethics will be both surprising and significant. Unfortunately, it is not 
quite clear that Ladd's distinction between the model of rights and the 
model which correctly characterizes the physician-patient relationship 
is not a distinction without a difference . The objective, therefore, of 
this paper shall be to note the results of Ladd's distinction and to 
investigate whether or not differences between the two models 
warrant the distinction. 
1. 
It is usually thought that rights and obligations or duties go hand in 
hand. A right to X entails a duty suffered by all others not to inter-
fere with the securing of X. Rights are quite often taken as claims 
which are exercised against others. A right to life is a claim against all 
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others guaranteeing freedom from attack, except under very special 
circumstances. Needs, on the other hand, usually do not place upon 
others the duty to satisfy them. Needs are not claims one has against 
others. Nevertheless, a second party may be said to have a responsibil-
ity to satisfy a first party's need. For example, if one comes upon a 
starving person, it would seem that one would have the responsibility 
of helping the individual. We would not, however, say that the starving 
individual had a right to the required food . The starving individual 
simply had a need. The second party might be said to have a right to 
food, for example, if the second party's food actually belonged to the 
one who is starving. But if the food belonged to the second party, 
then given that we all have a responsibility to relieve great suffering 
when it entails no significant sacrifice on our parts, the most that can 
be said is that the second party should feed the starving person. 
There may, of course, be other differences between the model of 
rights and the model of responsibilities. Indeed, according to Ladd, 
there are four points of difference between the two models, each of 
which is sufficient to exclude one modeled relationship from the 
other. First, rights are "peremptory" while needs are not. Rights 
impose certain duties the accordance with which is not subject to 
debate. Needs simplicitor, on the other hand, impose no duties, and 
behaving in accordance with one's responsibilities may be subject to 
challenge. Second, no matter how dependent the parties might be 
upon one another, as far as their relationship is one of right-holder and 
duty-holder, the two parties are independent of each other and equal. 
There is, according to Ladd, a "prior" equality between the parties. 
The notion of a contract would make no sense if one party were able 
to impose his will upon the other because of some inequality between 
them. 2 This prior equality fails to obtain in relationships characterized 
by responsibility. Indeed, in relationships characterized by the model 
of responsibilities there is an assumed "prior" inequality between the 
two parties. In general, the inequality intrinsic to relationships of 
responsibility is exemplified in the principle: "from each according to 
his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs." 3 In the relation-
ship of responsibility, one party is in a position to extend help or 
benefit while the reciprocating party stands in need of that specific 
benefit. 
Third, the relationship of rights assumes a prior parity between the 
parties; it need not entail a respect for individual worth between the 
parties. The respect which obtains in right relationships is the result of 
that relationship. The respect which obtains in relationships of respon-
sibility, however, is one of individual worth and consequently serves as 
the reason for or cause of the responsible relationship being manifest. 
Finally, responsibilities, it is maintained, are dynamic, while rights are 
not. 4 Responsibilities change according to the changes in the needs 
and circumstances between the parties. Such changes, however, do not 
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affect right relationships. The increase in knowledge, for example, 
obtained by one party may change or perhaps even eliminate a first 
party's responsibility to a second. Such an increase in knowledge 
would not however alter the rights students have against teachers. 
II. 
According to Ladd, the patient-physician relationship is more 
appropriately characterized in terms of the model of responsibilities 
than in terms of the model of rights. In some cases at least, patients do 
not have a right to physician services nor do physicians have a duty to 
perform the requested services. Patient requests for physician services 
are not, Ladd maintains, peremptory. Moreover, patients are in need 
of help, and physicians are in the appropriate position to extend the 
requisite help. This need and service are the basis of the relationship 
between the aforementioned parties. There is, in other words, a prior 
disparity between the parties which serves as the basis of the patient-
physician relationship. In addition, the reciprocal respect between the 
patient and the physician exists prior to the relationship. Indeed, 
respect for the physician serves as an impetus for seeing the physician 
when one is in the necessary physical condition, and it is the respect 
for individual well-being which initiates appropriate physician 
behavior. This is not, of course, to deny that respect might not 
emanate in virtue of the relationship, only that the respect which is 
essential between the physician and patient is prior to the relationship. 
Finally, the relationship between the patient and the physician 
changes according to the health of the patient. As the relationship 
changes, so also do the responsibilities. Physicians then have certain 
responsibilities to patients and although not the same, patients have 
certain reciprocal responsibilities to physicians. This responsibility 
relationship which obtains between patients and physicians, according 
to Ladd, eliminates the possibility of characterizing such a relationship 
according to the model of rights. 
If Ladd is correct, there are significant ramifications for the future 
analysis of the relationship between mother-fetus, and possible organ 
donor and possible organ recipient. Consider, for instance, the issue of 
abortion. According to some,5 although the fetus may have a right to 
life, i.e., may be treated as a person, it does not have a right to the 
mother's sacrifice. A right to X does not carryover to a right to all 
things necessary for X. Thus, although the fetus may have a right to 
life, the fetus does not have a right to the mother's body which is, at 
least within the first trimester, necessary for life. Therefore, abortion 
on demand is not inconsistent with the proposition that the fetus 
enjoys a right to life. 
It may , of course, be thought that the above argument fails since it 
overlooks the important fact that in an abortion the fetus is killed. 
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Although a right to life may not be sufficient to guarantee everything 
necessary for the actual exercise of the right, it is sufficient to guar-
antee not being killed. Therefore, since the fetus is killed during an 
abortion and the right to life amounts to a claim held against all others 
guaranteeing freedom from being killed (without due process), a right 
to life constitutes a claim against all others guaranteeing freedom from 
abortion. Unfortunately, there is comparative difference between the 
paradigm case of wrongfully violating one's right to life and the case 
of abortion which may prove significant. In the abortion case, the 
fetus has been separated from a life support system (the mother's 
body) to which the fetus's right to life is insufficient to lay claim. The ~ 
intention in the abortion case need not refer to the fetus's death but 
merely the separation of the mother from the life-dependent fetus. 
The empirical ramification of the separation is death, but death need 
not be the motivation of the separation. The motivation could quite 
consistently be the retainment of all that rightfully belongs to the 
mother. Thus, abortion might be argued to be analogous to not saving ~1 
someone after the needy individual has, intentionally or not, placed 
another in a position of saving them. The paradigm case of wrongfully 
violating another's right to life, however, has none of these character-
istics. In the paradigm case, if the one attacked is wrongfully not being 
saved, it is only after being put in jeopardy by the attacker. Otherwise, 
the attacker in the paradigm case is not merely not saving but actually 
intentionally endeavoring to harm the one attacked. 
Given the above remonstration, it may at least be maintained that 
the pro-abortion position cannot be as easily dismissed. Nonetheless, 
even if the fetus may not have a right to all that is necessary for life, 
the mother may, if Ladd is correct, have a responsibility not to aboit. 
There is, after all, a special relationship which obtains between mother 
and fetus which, in general, is characterized in terms of concern for 
the fetus. It is not, however, that the mother is, in fact, just concerned 
with the fetus. Rather, we generally believe that this concern should 
be shown. Furthermore, the fetus is related to the mother in a way 
which obviously shows a prior inequality and dependency, an inequal-
ity and dependency which may be changed through physical matura-
tion and education. Finally, abortion may be deemed preferable on 
grounds of self-preservation, or perhaps genetic defect, thus rendering 
the mother's responsibility not peremptory. It seems that the mother-
fetus relation is, according to the above analysis, more properly 
subsumed under the model of responsibilities than of rights. Although 
it might very well be true that the fetus may, as a person, possess a 
right to life and yet not have a right to all things necessary to exercise 
that initial right, it does not follow that the mother does not have a 
responsibility to the fetus, the terms of which refer to just those 
things which are necessary for the fetus to exercise the right to life. 
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The lack of a right to all that is necessary for the exercise of the right 
to life is either irrelevant or at least not as significant as the presence 
of mother's responsibility to the fetus. 
Consider also the issue of organ procurement. Although we may not 
have a right to the deceased's organs, we all may have, if Ladd's model 
of responsibility is employed, the pre-mortem responsibility to donate 
or allow the salvaging of them. 6 It might be argued that a special 
relationship obtains not just between every living being and every 
other but between every patient who needs a transplantable organ and 
every living person who will one day no longer be in a position to use 
his or her organs. If the model of responsibility is characterized by the 
principle of "to each according to their needs, from each according to 
their abilities," then it would seem that each of us has the pre-mortem 
responsibility to donate or allow the salvaging of our organs, post-
mortem. The relationship between those in need of organs and those 
who will someday no longer be in the physical condition to utilize 
them, appears to satisfy all the conditions specified in the model of 
responsibility. As was noted above, there would appear to obtain a 
relation which might be characterized in terms of concern and respect 
between organ needer and organ donor which is perhaps not unlike 
that said to obtain between past and present generations and future 
generations. Furthermore, there is an obvious prior disparity between 
the parties. There is no sacrifice to be made, however, by the living as 
there is in the prior example concerned with abortion. Moreover, since 
it is not a right of the person in need of organs to have the deceased's 
organs, the request for such is not peremptory. There may, that is, be 
significant empirical considerations which will determine whether or 
not a given individual should receive a needed organ, e.g. , prior rate of 
success of such transplants, efficacy of transplant to abate human 
suffering or death, religious beliefs of the reluctant donor, etc. Finally, 
such a dependency may be eliminated once the organ is transplanted 
and may even be superseded by technological advancement whereby 
artificial parts are produced which function more effectively than 
biological parts. Thus, each person's responsibility to donate or like-
wise give up one's organs might obtain only so long as there was a 
need for such. Such contingent circumstances would conceivably not 
affect a relationship characterized in terms of rights. 
The above, if correct, constitutes an application of Ladd's model of 
needs and responsibilities. Each example differs from the paradigm 
example of the patient-physician relationship only in that both omit 
reference to the physician. In the former case the relationship between 
patient and potential patient has been investigated while in the latter 
case the relationship between patient and potential non-patient has 
been analyzed. This application may be taken as either the significant 
result of a more correct ethical analysis of medical relationships (as in 
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the case of the mother and fetus) or as a surprising reductio of Ladd's 
position (as in the case of organ procurement), i.e., that since such an 
application follows from Ladd's position and since such an application 
is ludicrous, Ladd's position is untenable. No matter how significant 
or surprising the results, Ladd's position may prove unacceptable upon 
further investigation. 
III. 
It is obvious that Ladd intends the distinction between the two 
models to be mutually exclusive. If an act is properly characterized in 
terms of the rights model, then it cannot also be described in terms of 
needs and responsibilities. 7 But is this presentation correct? 
Ladd contends that rights and duties but not needs and responsibil-
ities are peremptory. This, however, seems at least suspect. Rights are 
never "carte blanche"; they are always circumscribed by conditions 
governing application. We have a right to free speech but this does not 
allow slander or the unwarranted screaming of "fire" in a crowded 
theater. We have the right to freedom of religion but this does not 
permit, under religious ritual, the sacrificing of vestal virgins or 
perhaps, more realistically, the concomitant taking of more than one 
marriage partner. Rights come, as it were prima facie or defeasibly. If 
this is correct, in what way are rights and duties peremptory while 
needs and responsibilities are not? 
It might be suggested that rights are peremptory in the sense that 
when an agent has a legitimate right to X, i.e., when the agent's right 
to X does not conflict with another's right or against impersonal pro-
hibitions, then there can be no debate over whether or not the agent 
can have X. The denial of X to the agent calls for censure of the duty 
holder. This may be quite true and yet fail to distinguish rights from 
responsibilities. If an agent A can be shown to have a responsibility to 
do X because of a special relationship with another, B, can there be 
debate over whether or not the agent B can justifiably expect A to do 
X? Would B's failure to do X not bring about moral censure? 
Second, the concept of a contract, Ladd maintains, would make no 
sense if a prior inequality between the contracting parties allowed one 
party to achieve domination over the other. This, however, is a remark 
about the concept of a "contract," not about the preconditions for 
such. Yet it is the preconditions for the responsibility relationships 
which are said to distinguish the model of rights from that of responsi-
bilities. It would indeed make little sense in a contractual agreement if 
one party could achieve hegemony by virtue of a pre-existing inequal-
ity if that pre-existing inequality were exactly what the contract was 
designed to eliminate or at least circumvent. But this, of course, does 
not imply that a pre-existing inequality in any way contradicts the 
notion of a contract. Nor does a pre-existing inequality in any way 
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militate the possibility or freedom to engage in a contract, unless of 
course, the inequality concerns the ability to engage in contracts. 
Indeed, it would seem that like the relationship of responsibilities, 
contracts are in many cases designed specifically to eliminate pre-
existing inequities. If this is correct and the notion of "freedom of 
contract constitutes a basic concept in the ethic of rights," then it 
would seem that even though there may be a pre-existing inequality 
between the parties, this in itself is not sufficient to exclude the 
characterization of the relationship according to the model of rights 
anymore than it would be to exclude it from the model of 
responsibilities. 
Again, Ladd's third distinguishing criterion seems easily circum-
ventable. Ladd maintains that respect for another is the result of a 
right whereas such right is the cause of a responsibility. Now it may be 
quite true that in relationships characterized in terms of responsibility 
the relationship of respect is more narrowly defined, e.g., patient and 
physician, whereas the relationships of rights are more general, e.g., 
citizen and citizen. Nevertheless, it does not follow that respect fol-
lows only from a relationship of rights rather than preceding it. We do 
after all, have to have respect for others in order to accord them the 
same privileges we ourselves would like to enjoy perhaps at their 
expense. Indeed, it might be argued that one gains certain rights only 
insofar as they are citizens, and whether or not they are treated as 
citizens is in some measure due to the respect we have for them as 
autonomous individuals. Again, if the above is correct, respectful 
relationships may precede right relationships. also. 
Finally, it is contended that relationships of responsibility are 
dynamic while those of rights are not. Ladd contends that, say, an 
increase in knowledge can change the prior state of inequality and 
thus eliminate the state of responsibility whereas such an increase in 
knowledge will not affect a right relationship. Note, however, that an 
increase in knowledge only allows for the two parties to move in and 
out of relationships characterized in terms of responsibilities. It does 
not eliminate the appropriateness of the responsibility relationship in 
those prior circumstances. As party X becomes more knowledgeable, 
Y's responsibility may diminish proportionately. This, however, does 
not mean that where two parties are in similar circumstances, one 
party does not have a responsibility to the other. This, of course, is 
true also of rights. Party X may have a right to live unless she/he has 
committed murder or if a state of civil war perhaps breaks out. But 
this does not mean that anyone not in the above mentioned circum-
stances does not enjoy a right to life. That rights are defeasible only 
implies that whether or not one has a right depends upon the 
empirical conditions; that one has a right to do X only so long as one 
is in a particular state. This, however, is the dynamic nature attributed 
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to responsibility relationships and as such fails to distinguish rights 
from responsibilities. 8 
If the above arguments have been successful, then, counter Ladd, the 
models of rights and responsibilities are not mutually exclusive. The 
model of rights appears related to the model of responsibilities so that 
the satisfaction of all the conditions for the latter is insufficient to 
exclude the relationship from the former. If this is true, then one 
cannot eliminate one model from an area of discourse without doing 
likewise to the other anymore than one can employ one model with-
out thereby using the other. Thus, the extrapolations of Ladd's initial 
positions are themselves viable positions only if the mother has a 
"duty" to the fetus and ' the living have a "duty" to donate or allow 
the salvaging of their organs. 
IV. 
It is not clear, however, that the above result is untoward. Relation-
ships of responsibility, as Ladd notes, are inspired by Kantian con-
siderations. A person bears a responsibility toward another by virtue 
of an appreciation of the individual as an end in himself. Indeed it 
would be inconsistent, Ladd ,might contend, for a person to assent to 
another's quality as an end in himself and yet deny any responsibility 
toward him. If these are indeed the proper grounds for ascribing 
responsibilities and given the soundness of the above presented argu-
ments which concluded that Ladd failed to show a significant differ-
ence between the models of rights and responsibilities, then if we have 
responsibilities toward another on such Kantian grounds, he or she has 
rights against us for the same reasons. At least as presented by Ladd, 
the difference between the two models resides not with the quality of 
the relationship but rather with the strength of such. Some rights are 
very difficult to defeat, e.g., the right to life, whereas some rights are 
much easier to defeat, e.g., the right to another's organs. The differ-
ence in defeasibility of obligatory relationships is what perhaps Ladd 
captured in his analysis, rather than a qualitative difference in such 
relationships. 9 
Accordingly, it would seem that persons in need of organ trans-
plants have a highly defeasible moral right of some sort to a deceased's 
viable organs if it can be shown that we have a responsibility to supply 
the needy with organs. This right would of course not be directed 
toward anyone in particular, but would perhaps justify a policy of 
organ scavenging. The fact that a living person possesses - as well as 
needs - his own organs is sufficient reason for allowing him to retain 
his· organs. 10 Once dead, however, the original possessor of organs 
loses special claim to the organs, as well, of course, as any need for 
them. The needed organs should then be given to needy persons as an 
execution of our duty toward them. 11 
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In the case of abortion, Ladd's analysis leads to the following 
reasonable consequence. If a fetus is taken as having the status of a 
person, then this fact entails that other persons, notably the mother, 
have responsibilities and duties toward him. This only constitutes a 
strong reason to refrain from abortion. This defeasible fetal right to 
life would necessitate that a prospective mother have some justifica-
tion for aborting beyond mere caprice, e.g., danger to mother's life. 
v. 
It might, nevertheless, be suggested that not all patient-physician 
relationships can be adequately accounted for in terms of the con-
tractual relationship described in terms of rights and duties. To engage 
in a contractual relationship with a patient, it must first be assumed 
that one is interacting with an autonomous, self-directed and 
responsible individual. Nonetheless, severe illness frequently results in 
a state of diminished autonomy and responsibility. Although the 
physician has the duty to eventually inform the patient, the physi-
cian's responsibility to the patient's well-being may call for behavior 
which might be referred to as "paternalistic." Such paternalistic 
behavior might be justified when - and perhaps only when - it is 
designed to further enhance patient self-government (as opposed to 
militating such self-regulation). Still, the physician who failed to be 
paternalistic in a situation where the patient was in no position to 
grant an informed consent, could hardly be considered to have done 
something wrong. The physician who was, on the other hand, pater-
nalistic in such circumstances, might be said to have engaged in 
commendable behavior. Thus, it might be suggested that the distinc-
tion between the models of rights and responsibilities rests not with 
Ladd's noted features, but rather in how we might appraise actions. In 
general, not fulfilling one's duty in appropriate circumstances is 
wrong. Fulfilling one's duty in appropriate circumstances is not praise-
worthy, but necessary. However, fulfilling one's responsibility in 
appropriate circumstances is not mandatory but praiseworthy. Con-
sequently, not fulfilling one's responsibility in germane circumstances 
while not commendable, need not be considered wrong. Thus the 
physician must (has the duty) to inform the patient in the proper 
circumstances unless the patient presently fails to be an appropriate 
candidate for informed consent. In such a case the physician has the 
respollsibility to help the patient regain the status of being such a 
candidate. 
What may result from the above suggestion is the view that the 
models of rights and responsibilities, while distinct in some areas, are 
not so because of considerations promulgated by Ladd. Neither are 
the relationships between patients and physicians to be exclusively 
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characterized according to one model over the other. Finally, just as 
both models may be employed in the medical context, so also may 
both be employed at the periphery of the medical context, e.g., in 
cases of abortion and organ procurement. 
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